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Article III, section 2, of the United States Constitution grants admi-
ralty jurisdiction to the federal courts.' Because the Constitution neither
defines the parameters of admiralty jurisdiction nor provides criteria for
setting such parameters, the breadth of this jurisdictional grant has never
been clear.' Traditionally, if a tort occurred upon the high seas or navigable
waters, courts found admiralty jurisdiction to exist.3 Application of this
I U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1 provides that "the Judicial Power shall extend . . to
all Cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction. . . ... This grant was implemented by the
Judiciary Act, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 73, 77 (1789). The Act declared that the district courts shall
have "exclusive cognizance of all civil causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction." The
subject is now covered by 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (1970) which states that the district courts shall
have original jurisdiction in "[a]ny civil case of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction, saving
to suitors in all cases all other remedies to which they are otherwise entitled."
The concept of a separate jurisdiction for admiralty was brought to America by the
British settlers and was adopted by many if not all of the colonies. See Chamblee, An
Introduction to Admiralty, 22 MERCER L. REv. 523 (1971); Note, Admiralty Jurisdiction Over
Torts, 25 HARV. L. REv. 381 (1912); 7 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 459 (1974). Tribunals within
the colonies continued the exercise of power over admiralty cases until the organization of
the federal government. See Panama R.R. Co. v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 375 (1924)(constitutional
provisions presupposed the existence of an admiralty jurisdiction). See generally Putnam,
How the Federal Courts Were Given Admiralty Jurisdiction, 10 CORNELL L.Q. 460 (1925)
[hereinafter cited as Putnam].
2 Green v. Pope & Talbott, Inc., 328 F. Supp. 71, 76 (D.Md. 1971), aff'd., 459 F.2d 365
(4th Cir. 1972); see The Lottawanna, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 558, 576 (1874) (the extent of admi-
ralty jurisdiction is exclusively a judicial question).
3 The "strict locality" test of admiralty jurisdiction was described by Chief Justice Story
in De Lovio v. Boit, 7 F. Cas. 418 (C.C.D. Mass. 1815) (No. 3,776), as extending admiralty
jurisdiction to torts committed on the high seas and ports or harbors within the ebb and flow
of the tide. See St. Hilaire Moye v. Henderson, 496 F.2d 973 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
884 (1974); Thomas v. Lane, 23 F. Cas. 957 (C.C.D.Me. 1813)(No. 13,902); 7 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 459 (1974). This formulation of the rule was modified by The Propeller Genesee
Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 233 (1851), which eliminated the tidewater limitation
and extended jurisdiction to all waters of the United States which were navigable in interstate
for foreign commerce. See United States v. Stoeco Homes, Inc., 498 F.2d 597 (3d Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 420 U.S. 927 (1975); George v. Beavark, Inc., 402 F.2d 977 (8th Cir. 1968). In
The Plymouth, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 20 (1866), the Court held that a suit in admiralty does not
lie where damage occurs on land, even when the damage is caused by the negligent operation
of a vessel. Id. at 36.
For more extensive discussions of the history and development of admiralty jurisdiction,
see Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City of Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249 (1972) (plane crash in
navigable water); Detroit Trust Co. v. The Barlum, 293 U.S. 21 (1934)(mortgage forclosure
on ship); United States v. Bevans, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 336 (1818) (homicide in navigable
waters); Bell, Admiralty Jurisdiction In The Wake of Executive Jet, 15 Aiuz. L. REV. 67 (1973)
[hereinafter cited as Bell]; Black, Admiralty Jurisdiction: Critique And Suggestions, 50
CoLuM. L. REv. 259 (1950); Deutsch, Development Of The Theory of Admiralty Jurisdiction
In The United States, 35 TuL. L. REv. 117 (1960) [hereinafter cited as Deutsch]; Putnam,
supra note 1; Robertson, Admiralty Procedure And Jurisdiction After The 1966 Unification,
434 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW
"strict locality" test resulted in claims having no relation to maritime
commerce being entertained in federal courts sitting in admiralty.' Conse-
quently, the "strict locality" test failed to provide a specialized body of law
to serve maritime commerce which would be uniformly applied, the pur-
pose of the jurisdictional grant.5 In 1972, the United States Supreme Court
modified this jurisdictional test in Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City of
Cleveland,' holding that a cause of action sounding in tort is not cognizable
under admiralty jurisdiction unless the alleged wrong occurs on navigable
waters and is significantly related to traditional maritime activity.7 The
Fourth Circuit recently applied this "locality-plus" test8 in Moore v.
Hampton Roads Sanitation District Commission9 to reject admiralty juris-
diction in an action arising out of the destruction of oyster beds by a
municipal sewage plant.'"
The plaintiff oystermen were lessees of oyster beds" located in a naviga-
74 MICH. L. REV. 1627 (1976); Zobel, Admiralty Jurisdiction, Unification, And The American
Lau; Institue, 6 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 375 (1969).
See, e.g., Davis v. City of Jacksonville Beach, 251 F. Supp. 327 (M.D.Fla. 1965) (injury
to a swimmer by a surfboard); King v. Testerman, 214 F. Supp. 335 (E.D.Tenn. 1963)
(injuries to water skier).
See Adams v. Montana Power Co., 528 F.2d 437, 439 (9th Cir. 1975); Peytavin v. Gov't
Employees Ins. Co., 453 F.2d 1121, 1127 (5th Cir. 1972); 1 E. JHIRAD & A. SANN, BENEDICT ON
ADMIRALTY § 105 (7th ed. 1974); 27 VAD. L. REV. 343 (1974). Compare T. Smith & Son, Inc.
v. Taylor, 276 U.S. 179 (1928)(longshoreman knocked from wharf into water by sling lowered
from vessel; admiralty jurisdiction denied) with Minnie v. Port Huron Terminal Co., 295 U.S.
647 (1935) (longshoreman knocked by vessel's hoist onto adjacent wharf; cause of action in
admiralty).
6 409 U.S. 249 (1972).
Id. at 268. In Executive Jet, an airplane struck a flock of seagulls as it was taking off
from an airport located on the shores of Lake Erie. As a result of ingesting many of the birds
in its engines, the plane lost power and bounced off the runway, settling in Lake Erie.
Although there were no injuries, the plane sank and was a total loss. The Supreme Court
rejected the contention of the plane's owners that because the plane sank in navigable waters,
they should have been entitled to sue the airport in admiralty. Id. The Court concluded that
it is "far more consistent with the history and purpose of admiralty to require also that the
wrong bear a significant relationship to traditional maritime activity." Id. See generally Kelly
v. United States, 531 F.2d 1144 (2d Cir. 1976); Peytavin v. Gov't Employees Ins. Co., 453
F.2d 1121 (5th Cir. 1972); Bell, supra note 3; Birdwell & Whtten, Admiralty Jurisdiction: The
Outlook For The Doctrine Of Executive Jet, 1974 DUKE L.J. 757; Fallon, Maritime Tort
Jurisdiction-Pre & Post Executive Jet Aviation v. City of Cleveland, 21 LA. B.J. 169 (1973).
The Court noted that some lower courts have required that the traditional maritime activities
involve navigation or commerce on navigable waters. 409 U.S. at 256. The Court criticized
lower court decisions which "sustained admiralty jurisdiction despite the lack of any connec-
tion between the wrong and traditional forms of maritime commerce and navigation." Id. at
255-56.
The Executive Jet test is a "locality plus" test in that the traditional maritime locality
is required plus a maritime nexus. 409 U.S. at 268.
1 557 F.2d 1030 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 46 U.S.L.W. 3430 (U.S. Jan. 10, 1978)(77-
540).
" Id. at 1037-38.
The Commonwealth of Virginia grants leases of underwater beds for the cultivation
and harvesting of oysters at a nominal price for automatically renewable twenty year terms.
VA. CODE § 28.1-109(12) (1973).
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ble'2 tidal river contiguous with the City of Newport News, Virginia.' '2 The
plaintiffs claimed that improper operation of a sewage disposal system by
the City of Newport News [City] and the Hampton Roads Sanitation
District Commission [Commission] resulted in condemnation of their
oyster beds by the State Health Commission" without just compensation. '5
The sewage system consisted of pumping stations operated by the City
which pumped sewage to treatment plants operated by the Commission.'6
The oystermen contended that portions of their oyster beds located around
the sewage treatment plant's outflow pipes were permanently condemned
for shellfishing purposes pursuant to Food and Drug Administration rec-
ommendations that "buffer zones" be established around such outflow
pipes to provide a margin of safety in the event a sewage plant should
suffer a breakdown.' 7 The oystermen alleged that they should have been
compensated for the loss of their oyster beds and that failure of the Com-
mission to compensate them constituted a taking of their property without
due process of law.'8 The oystermen's claim against the City involved dif-
ferent oyster beds that were closed by the State Health Commission be-
cause of actual contamination. The oystermen alleged that negligent oper-
ation of the City's pumping stations and lateral sewage conduits resulted
in the draining of raw sewage into the Warwick River.'9 In a trial before a
jury on the issue of the liability of the City and the Commission,"0 the
district court directed a verdict in the Commission's favor on the grounds
that the Commission paid the oystermen for that part of the leasehold
constituting the outer line of the buffer zone.' The district judge also
granted the City's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the
12 For purposes of admiralty jurisdiction, water is navigable if it is used or is susceptible
of being used as an artery of commerce. See The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557, 559
(1871); Adams v. Montana Power Co., 528 F.2d 437, 439 (9th Cir. 1975); United States v.
Stoeco Homes, Inc., 498 F.2d 597, 610 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 927 (1975); note
3 supra.
' 557 F.2d at 1031.
" For the purpose of protecting the shellfishing industry as well as the public health, the
State Health Commissioner may determine that a shellfish area is polluted or has a pollution
hazard so great as to make it unfit for oyster cultivation. VA. CODE §§ 28.1-175 to 28.1-181
(1973). On the basis of the Commissioner's determination and in accordance with Food and
Drug Administration guidelines, certain areas of the oystermen's leaseholds were condemned.
557 F.2d at 1032; see 40 Fed. Reg. 25,930 (1975).
11 See U.S. CONST. amend. V (private property shall not be taken without just compensa-
tion).
" 557 F.2d at 1032.
' Brief For The Appellants at 1; see 40 Fed. Reg. 25,930 (1975).
" 557 F.2d at 1031.
" Id. at 1032.
" The issue of damages was reserved. Id.
22 Id. at 1032 n.3. The district court also concluded that because the buffer zone was
established by the State Health Commissioner, closure was an appropriate exercise of the
Commonwealth's police power and did not constitute a taking of the oystermen's property
by the Commission without due process of law. Id.; see note 27 infra.
1978]
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grounds that the doctrine of sovereign immunity2 and the failure of the
oystermen to give the City the required statutory notice of their claims 2
barred the oystermen's action. 4 The oystermen appealed the judgments of
the district court 2' arguing that the case fell within the admiralty jurisdic-
tion of the court and that under admiralty law,26 neither the Virginia
doctrine of sovereign immunity nor the statutory notice requirement would
bar the plaintiffs from recovery.
2
In Virginia, the development of the common law concept of soevereign immunity has
established that a municipality acts in a dual capacity. In its governmental capacity, the
municipality is immune from liability for negligence. In its properietary capacity, a munici-
pality is subject to liability just as a private individual or corporation. Fenon v. City of
Norfolk, 203 Va. 551, 555, 125 S.E.2d 808, 811 (1962); see Hoggard v. City of Richmond, 172
Va. 145, 200 S.E. 610 (1939). In Virginia, when the municipality carries out its governmental
function, it acts as an agent of the state and hence is a sovereign body. 18 E. MCQUILLIN,
THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATONS § 53.01a (3d rev. vol. 1977). Compare Hoggard v. City
of Richmond, 172 Va. 145, 200 S.E. 610 (1939)(operating a swimming pool; held proprietary)
and City of Portsmouth v. Madrey, 168 Va. 517, 191 S.E. 595 (1937)(operating a ferry; held
proprietary) with Taylor v. City of Newport News, 214 Va. 9, 197 S.E.2d 209 (1973) (removal
of garbage; held governmental) and Franklin v. Town of Richards, 161 Va. 156, 170 S.E. 718
(1933)(maintaining a jail; held governmental).
" VA. CODE § 8-653 (1957), as it read before the 1973 amendments, required the oyster-
men to give the City notice of their claims within sixty days. The amended statute now
requires that notice be given within six months. VA. CODE § 8.01-222 (1977).
11 557 F.2d at 1032.
Id. The City and Commission cross-appealed from an interlocutory order denying their
motions to dismiss the action in order to preserve their contention that they had an unquali-
fied right to discharge sewage into the river. Id. at 1031 n.1. They relied primarily upon
Darling v. City of Newport News, 123 Va. 14, 96 S.E. 307 (1918), aff'd, 249 U.S. 540 (1919),
in which the United States Supreme Court agreed with the Virginia court's ruling that lessees
of oyster beds must bear the risk of water pollution. The Darling court noted that the leases
were held subject to the right of the Commonwealth to authorize municipalities to discharge
sewage. 249 U.S. at 543. Virginia has imposed strict controls on the discharge of sewage into
state waters since 1939, however, and presently prohibits the discharge of inadequately
treated sewage into such waters. VA. CODE §§ 62.1-44.18 to 62.1-44.19 (1973 & Supp. 1977).
The Fourth Circuit panel concluded that because the discharge of sewage is no longer legal,
the oystermen's right to hold leases on oyster beds is not subject to a right of the City or
Commission to violate state law. 557 F.2d at 1033. The court en banc did not address this
issue.
2 When the application of state law will impair uniformity of admiralty law or when
an admiralty principle preempts state law, maritime law controls the disposition of all sub-
stantive issues. 557 F.2d at 1034; see Workman v. New York City, 179 U.S. 552, 563 (1900);
Pryor v. American President Lines, 520 F.2d 974, 977 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
1055 (1976).
" 557 F.2d at 1037. The oystermen also appealed the directed verdict in favor of the
Commission, arguing that the closure of the oyster beds to cultivation amounted to an uncon-
stitutional taking of property. Brief For The Appellants at 3. The oystermen admitted that
they had received compensation for the land directly beneath the outer line ofthe buffer zone,
but maintained that they were also entitled to recover damages for their leaseholds within
the buffer zone. Id. at 4-5, citing United States v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 365 U.S. 624
(1960)(where part of a tract is taken in the exercise of eminent domain, the owner is entitled
to recover damages for the part taken and for injuries to the residue). The Fourth Circuit
panel rejected this argument and affirmed the directed verdict. The panel reasoned that the
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On appeal, the Fourth Circuit panel reversed the district court's judg-
ment in favor of the City.2 8 The panel's opinion concluded that the case
fell within the admiralty jurisdiction of the district court., Applying the
"locality-plus" test,3" the panel reasoned that the affected oyster beds were
located in a navigable stream subject to the ebb and flow of the tides, thus
fulfilling the locality requirement." In addition, the.panel found that the
alleged wrong bore a significant relationship to traditional maritime activ-
ity.3" The majority reasoned that the cultivation of oysters is closely related
to the harvesting of oysters which, like fishing, is a traditional maritime
activity." Because of this close relationship, the panel concluded that in-
terference with oyster cultivation which impairs harvesting fulfills the
Executive Jet maritime nexus requirement." Applying maritime law to the
case,35 the majority concluded that the City could not claim immunity
from liability for negligence." The application of maritime, law also con-
trolled the panel's determination that the doctrine of laches37 rather than
the state notice statute should apply." The Fourth Circuit remanded this
issue to allow the district court to consider all facts respecting laches. 9
oystermen took their leases subject to the right of the Commission to discharge treated
sewage. 557 F.2d at 1035; see note 25 supra. The court en banc did not consider this issue.
" 557 F.2d at 1035.
2 Id. Senior Judge Field dissented from the majority's opinion that the destruction of
oyster beds falls within the admiralty jurisdiction of the district court. Id. at 1035-37 (Field,
J., concurring in part; dissenting in part). Field concluded that the cultivation of oysters is
not a traditional maritime activity and, for that reason, fails to fulfill the maritime nexus
requirement of Executive Jet. Id.; see note 7 supra. Furthermore, Field noted that prior
decisions of the United States Supreme Court indicate that the cultivation of oysters is a
purely local activity and that therefore the City's intrusion upon the oystermen's leaseholds
was not a maritime tort. 557 F.2d at 1036-37 (Field, J., concurring in part; dissenting in part);
see text accompanying notes 39-45 infra.
See text accompanying note 7 supra.
31 557 F.2d at 1034; see note 12 supra; cf. note 3 supra (tidal water requirement no longer
exists).
557 F.2d at 1034; see text accompanying note 7 supra.
557 F.2d at 1034.
SId.
See note 26 supra.
557 F.2d at 1035. Before concluding that maritime law should apply, the panel consid-
ered whether the application of state law concerning sovereign immunity and statutory notice
would impair the uniformity of admiralty law and whether there was an admiralty principle
which preempted state law. Id.; see note 26 supra. The panel reasoned that because all parties
were Virginia residents, the importance of uniformity was reduced. 557 F.2d at 1034. The right
of a municipality to claim immunity for performance of governmental functions is narrower
under admiralty law than under the common law of Virginia. Id. at 1034-35; e.g., Workman
v. New York City, 179 U.S. 552 (1900)(cause of action in admiralty based on negligent
operation of a fireboat defeats state law vesting a municipality with immunity); see note 22
supra.
: In admiralty, the doctrine of laches provides that where there is no inexcusable delay
in seeking a remedy and where no prejudice to the defendant results from the mere passage
of time, courts should not deny relief. Gardner v. Panama R. Co., 342 U.S. 29, 30-31 (1951);
see Chevron Oil Co. v. Hudson, 404 U.S. 97 (1963).
557 F.2d at 1035.
'Id.
1978]
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On rehearing en banc, the Fourth Circuit addressed the issue of
whether the case fell within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the
district court." The Fourth Circuit reversed the panel decision holding that
damage to the oystermen's leaseholds from sewage discharge is not related
to the maritime aspects of the oystering industry, and that therefore, the
maritime nexus requirement of Executive Jet's "locality-plus" test was not
satisfied." The court disagreed with the panel's jurisdictional analysis
which viewed the case from the perspective of the entire spectrum of the
oyster industry." Rather, the court confined its analysis to oyster cultiva-
tion" finding that activity to be purely local and subject to the laws and
jurisdiction of the state.44 The Fourth Circuit reasoned that oystermen
obtained their leaseholds from the Commonwealth of Virginia45 and that
cultivation of oysters on such leaseholds is subject to regulation by the
Commonwealth. 6 In addition, the court reasoned that the Executive Jet
decision suggests that a traditional maritime activity involves naviga-
tion or commerce on navigable water; however, the oystermen's activities
have nothing to do with commerce until the oysters become the subject of
trade.17 The court recognized that many activities incident to the harvest-
° Id. at 1037.
' Id. at 1039; see text accompanying note 7 supra.
4 557 F.2d at 1037; see text accompanying notes 32-34 supra.
' 557 F.2d at 1037. Neither counsels briefs nor the opinions indicate whether the pollu-
tion affected any other phase of oystering besides oyster cultivation.
" Id. at 1037-38.
Id. at 1038; see note 11 supra. The court noted that the recognition of state sovereignty
over lands located beneath navigable waters within their boundaries originated in Pollard's
Lessee v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 391 (1845). The title of the state to such land was reiterated
in Weber v. Harbor Comm'rs, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 57 (1873), and is presently codified at 43
U.S.C. § 1311(a) (1970) which states that "title to and ownership of the lands beneath
navigable waters within the boundaries of the respective States . . . and the right and power
to . . . lease . . . the said lands . . . in accordance with applicable State law be,. . . vested
in and assigned to the respective States .. " See United States v. Alaska, 422 U.S. 184
(1975); Bonelli Cattle Co. v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 313 (1973).
1' 557 F.2d at 1037-39. The right of the state to regulate oyster cultivation was affirmed
in Smith v. Maryland, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 71 (1855), and McCready v. Virginia, 94 U.S. 391
(1876), and is codified at 43 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (1970). See note 45 supra. However, state
regulations may not change the general features of admiralty law so as to defeat uniform
administration. Askew v. American Waterways Operators, Inc., 411 U.S. 325 (1973); Western
Fuel Co. v. Garcia, 257 U.S. 233 (1921); Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149 (1920).
See also Judy, State Protection From Oil Spills: Askew v. American Waterways Operators,
Inc., 4 ENVT'L L. 433 (1974); Scherr, Admiralty's Power in Re Oil Pollution: The Ability of
the State to Set More Stringent Penalties Than Those of the Federal Government, 7 NAT.
REsouRCFs LAW. 635 (1974); 24 ME. L. REV. 299 (1972).
,1 557 F.2d at 1038; see Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City of Clevland, 409 U.S. at 256
(1972); note 7 supra. The Fourth Circuit relied upon McCready v. Virginia, 94 U.S. 391
(1876). In McCready, the Supreme Court decided that a Virginia statute which prohibited
nonresidents of Virginia from planting oysters in the beds of the tidal waters of the state was
not a violation of the commerce clause because transportation or exchange of commodities
was not involved, but only cultivation and production. "Commerce has nothing to do with
land while producing, but only with the product after it has become the subject of trade."
Id. at 396. McCready subsequently as limited by Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948).
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ing of oysters are sufficiently related to the maritime aspects of the oyster
industry to fulfill the maritime nexus requirement.4 8 Nevertheless, because
the mere cultivation of oysters is local in character, it lacks the necessary
relationship. 9
On three previous occasions, the Fourth Circuit considered the mari-
time nexus requirement of Executive Jet.50 Although Moore is the first time
that the Fourth Circuit applied the "locality-plus" test to deny jurisdiction
in a situation that was not specifically addressed in Executive Jet,5' the
jurisdictional analysis employed by the court is not new. On each previous
occasion, the court weighed the need for uniformity against the local na-
ture of the activity and suitability of state tort law.52 Other circuits which
have confronted the "locality-plus" question in situations not specifically
addressed in Executive Jet,13 have not uniformly applied the test.54 The
Toomer, which involved a South Carolina statute governing shrimp fishing, distinguished
McCready as pertaining only to non-migatory fish regulated in inland waters. 334 U.S. at 401;
see Manchester v. Massachusetts, 139 U.S. 240, 245 (1891). Therefore, the Fourth Circuit's
analysis probably would not apply to activities other than oyster cultivation. Cf. Adams v.
Montana Power Co., 528 F.2d 437, 439 (9th Cir. 1975) (commerce for purposes of admiralty
jurisdiction means activities related to the business of shipping).
41 557 F.2d at 1039. The court conceded that a collision involving an oyster boat or injury
to a crewman on board such a vessel would be considered traditional maritime activities. Id.
SId.
The Fourth Circuit denied admiralty jurisdiction in a case involving a water skier's
suit against the operator of a towboat for negligently causing his injury. Crosson v. Vance,
484 F.2d 840 (4th Cir. 1973). The court also denied admiralty jurisdiction in a case involving
a diving accident in which the driver struck a submerged boat ramp in a lake where the
defendant controlled the water level. Onley v. South Carolina Elec. & Gas. Co., 488 F.2d 758
(4th Cir. 1973). In a third case involving pleasure boat torts, the Fourth Circuit held admi-
ralty jurisdiction to exist. Richards v. Blake Builders Supply, Inc., 528 F.2d 745 (4th Cir.
1975). The court felt that Executive Jet could not be construed as overruling prior precedent
for including pleasure boat torts in admiralty jurisdiction. Id. at 749.
5, The Supreme Court in Executive Jet expressly disapproved of the finding of admiralty
jurisdiction in Davis v. City of Jacksonville Beach, Fla., 251 F. Supp. 327 (M.D. Fla.
1965)(injury to a swimmer by a surfboard), and King v. Testerman, 214 F. Supp. 355 (E.D.
Tenn. 1963)(injuries to water skier). 409 U.S. at 256 n.5. The Executive Jet Court also noted
the absurdity of granting admiralty jurisdiction in cases involving injury to a swimmer at a
public beach "by another swimmer or by a submerged object on the bottom." Id. at 255. The
Court cited with approval Chapman v. City of Grosse Pointe Farms, 385 F.2d 962 (6th Cir.
1967) (denying admiralty jurisdiction to the claim of a swimmer injured when diving in
shallow water). 409 U.S. at 256.
5 In Crosson v. Vance, 484 F.2d 840 (4th Cir. 1973), the court noted that any reason for
federal concern over litigation of pleasure boat torts is vague and uncertain. Id. at 841.
Moreover, the states are capable of resolving such controversies out of their existing laws. Id.
The Fourth Circuit in Onley v. South Carolina Elec. & Gas Co., 488 F.2d 758 (4th Cir. 1973),
reasoned that the uniform body of rules and expertise of admiralty are irrelevant to the issues
in a diving accident. State tort law is most directly concerned with such accidents and is
capable of resolving such controversies without any effect on the federal interest in maritime
activities. Id. at 760. In Richards v. Blake Builders Supply Co., 528 F.2d 745 (4th Cir. 1975),
the court criticized the inclusion of pleasure.craft torts in admiralty noting the local nature
of pleasure boat activities and the ability of state courts to cope with such disputes. Id. at
747-49.
0 Compare Adams v. Montana Power Co., 528 F.2d 437 (9th Cir. 1975)(pleasure boat
19781
